

and the remainder divided between the army, navy, and marines. Even as the Vietnam War expanded, U.S. force levels in Japan continued to decline.

By the mid-1960s, the United States all but abandoned its effort to promote large-scale Japanese rearmament. The self-defense forces totaled around 250,000 throughout the decade. In place of size, the Defense Department pressed Japan to improve the quality of its air and maritime forces. As a result, Japan's military evolved into an efficient defense force with little offensive capability.

The repair, communication, ammunition and oil storage, and recreational facilities the U.S. military retained in Japan were critical components of Asian defense strategy. These installations, along with those in Okinawa, Guam, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, formed a coordinated network east of Hawaii. Bases on Okinawa were especially vital to the air war in Vietnam. One million military transport and combat flights originated in the Ryukyus between 1965 and 1973. KC 135 tanker planes refueled B-52 bombers flying from Guam to Indochina, and the B-52s sometimes flew directly from the Ryukyus. Unrestricted by the 1960 security treaty, American forces stored chemical and nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Nearly three-fourths of the 400,000 tons of supplies required each month by American troops in Vietnam passed

the Korean War ended, except for a single general license plate. In December of that year, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, declared that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue fighting the Vietnam War."<sup>10</sup>

The Vietnam War escalated. American analysts noted that Japan's proximity to Southeast Asia made it a key element in the U.S. defense posture. The Japanese government had been asked to provide facilities for U.S. aircraft carriers to return to Hawaii or the West Coast for maintenance and repair in naval bases in Japan "saves us hundreds of millions of dollars peacetime" and would have even greater logistics value in certain types of war situations as the Korean War showed. Ammunition storage sites, repair facilities, and an industrial infrastructure made Japan the linchpin for the U.S. defense posture in East and Southeast Asia. A Senate subcommittee on military preparedness concluded in April 1966 that "it would be very difficult to fight the war in Southeast Asia without [bases] at Yokosuka and Sasebo."<sup>27</sup>

Although the security treaty barred the United States from introducing nuclear weapons to Japan without permission, the secret protocol of 1960 permitted nuclear-laden planes and ships to "transit" through the country. American war plans and informal ~~procedures~~ followed by local commanders stretched this loophole even further. Air force transport planes stationed on Pacific islands were assigned, in case of a war alert, to transport

nuclear weapons to U.S. air bases in Japan without obtaining Tokyo's approval. The weapons would then be deployed against targets in North-east Asia.<sup>57</sup>

While visiting Japan in the early 1960s as a Rand Corporation analyst working on a Pentagon study, Daniel Ellsberg uncovered a more serious violation of the security treaty. The small marine air base at Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, had a handful of planes assigned to attack some two dozen targets in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. The marines arranged with local navy officials to store nuclear bombs on an LST barge (the "San Joaquin County") semi-permanently moored a few hundred yards offshore. If needed, the motorized barge would approach the beach and send its bombs ashore on amphibious tractors directly to the marine airfield. Neither civilian nor military commanders in Washington seemed aware of this. Navy records, Ellsberg discovered, listed the LST as docked in Okinawa. The arrangement was "regarded as super-secret from the Japanese" and from civilians in the Pentagon.

The barge's vulnerability to sabotage and the high risk of public disclosure of its cargo prompted Feltberg to criticize the operation as hare-brained. Exposure might bring down the Japanese government, lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations, or even drive Japan toward Communism.

Paul Nitze and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as they called it "the most tactfully irresponsible action it was possible to imagine." To impress the navy, to remedy the problem, top admirals denominated themselves "Team McNamara," and they did a good job.

The nuclear weapons barges remained in place until the spring of 1966 when someone — probably Ellsberg — leaked word to Reischauer who was then <sup>head</sup> of the information. In the heat of counterrevolution, it <sup>represented</sup> a ~~very~~ violation of <sup>the</sup> word of trust <sup>that</sup> the pressure be removed and the <sup>existing</sup> tide of anti-American, anti-Vietnam War protests, he warned it would ignite a dangerous political explosion. Reischauer grew <sup>very</sup> <sup>angry</sup> with Rusk for this. Rusk <sup>never</sup> denied <sup>any</sup> of the things he <sup>had</sup> been <sup>told</sup> about the vessels and tacitly approved of their entry. Threatened to resign unless Rusk ordered its swift removal, Rusk complied, but the incident widened the gulf between the two men. (My wife, Reed, 199

By this time, Reischauer found it nearly impossible to defend the policies of the Johnson administration. His support within Congress had been eroded by their opposition to a Vietnam policy he believed in. Even before this latest incident, he decided to leave and return to Harvard during the summer of 1966. Once again, Rusk and Johnson stymied his effort. Declining to accept either his request to resign, the president and secretary of state, in July and then called Reischauer back to Washington for consultation.

Johnson met with Reischauer for an hour on July 22. The embassy hoped to speak about the damage America's China and Vietnam policies

Sato to send emissaries to neutral and Communist countries in pursuit of peace in Vietnam. However, Harriman made clear, any settlement must be based on "America's position of strength." Humphrey took a conciliatory approach, urging the prime minister to "take a more active role in Southeast Asian development" and promote a "greater Japanese presence and participation in South Vietnam." The vice president suggested that "the Japanese might wish to provide full medical services for one or more provinces in Vietnam." Little came of these ideas.<sup>20</sup>

The Japanese business community, concerned about American trade retaliation, urged Sato to placate Washington. Early in 1966, the prime minister issued public statements critical of China's nuclear program and recent H-bomb test. He restricted government credit to Beijing and barred a Chinese trade delegation from visiting Japan. Foreign Minister Shūna announced that in light of the security treaty, "Japan was not in a neutral position vis-à-vis the United States and North Vietnam." America fought to "maintain the security of the Far East" so Japan "had an obligation to furnish facilities and territories for this purpose."<sup>21</sup>

China lost no time in alerting Japan to the risks it courted by following the American lead in Vietnam. In February 1966, ranking Chinese official Wang Yusheng, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, told Sato:

... if the U.S. attacks Japan, the official stated, "the U.S. bombs China, unfortunately the U.S. is out of our reach. We are not able to return the blow. However, it is not impossible for us to teach Japan." The threat, American analysts agreed, sought to "push the Japanese into supporting the use of bases" and to use Japan to restrain the scope of

the American war in Vietnam.<sup>22</sup> Plainly, Vietnam opposed the war on its grounds and out of concern that Japan would be dragged into the conflict because of its security ties with the United States. *Behren* justified peace in Vietnam, self-determination for the Vietnamese, and cessation of Japanese complicity in the war. The movement maintained a separate identity from the socialist and Communist parties, which opposed the war on more ideological grounds and saw the nonpartisan anti-war activists as something of a threat to their following. *Behren* leaders and publications accused the *halo* government of being a co-conspirator with, not a passive accomplice to, the war. *Demos* in front of the U.S. embassy became so frequent by mid-1965 that riot police assumed a nearly permanent presence. Between 1965 and 1970, some eighteen million Japanese demonstrated against the Vietnam War.<sup>23</sup>

Union surveys during 1965 to 1968 found a sizeable majority of Japanese opposed to sending Vietnam and expanding the ground war. Respondents sympathized with the Viet Cong goal of toppling the Saigon regime. In 1968, at the height of American escalation, two-thirds of Japanese polled favored adopting a more neutral foreign

policy. Only 20 percent wanted to continue the security treaty with the United States after 1970 when it could be ended. (Support for the alliance increased in 1969 when Nixon began removing troops from Vietnam.)

Despite these trends, neither grassroots nor elite opposition to the war ever threatened Sato's domination of the LDP or the party's monopoly of power. The anti-war movement failed to arouse the depth of passion that the anti-security treaty movement had in 1960. Many Japanese opposed the war, but still voted for the LDP.

The structure of Japanese politics and the LDP further mitigated the impact of the anti-war movement. Prime ministers were chosen by Diet members, not voters. LDP faction leaders controlled blocs of Diet members in the bargaining process that resulted in selection of a party leader/prime minister. Party barons and their followers forged and broke alliances to gain control of cabinet posts, patronage, and rewards for constituents and campaign donors. Whenever possible, they avoided embracing popular causes or grappling with divisive issues. The Vietnam War was not so overwhelming a concern among voters as to force the LDP to take heed of anti-war sentiment or risk losing its Diet majority.

As American escalation continued, Japanese political parties responded to the situation in different ways. The LDP, which had been instrumental in the initial escalation, the United States spent about \$1 billion annually in subsidies to sympathetic newspapers and magazines and to individual members of the Democratic Socialist and Liberal Democratic parties. Americans made a special effort to influence politicians on Okinawa, where popular opposition to the use of bases for Vietnam operations brought back the *halo* government to Okinawa. The LDP, however, was not alone in this. The

Democrat party, the *Behren* movement, and the *Demos* movement, too, focused on the importance of keeping the lid on in Okinawa. In discussing the plan with military officials, his concern focused on assuring that leading national figures in "the Japanese LDP rather than the party's Okinawa branch" served as the primary conduit of American funds. This was "the most effective way" to assure both success and stealth. Defense Undersecretary of the Army John M. Steadman agreed that *Behren* was critical because if the "U.S. is caught with its hand in the cookie jar there will be a serious blowup in Japan."<sup>24</sup>

#### *The American Military in Japan*

In 1962, over 200,000 American military personnel remained on 1,700 bases and installations in Japan. These numbers shrank steadily the next decade. By 1964 (excluding facilities and personnel of the *Seventh Fleet*, 45,000 military dependents, and the sailors of the Japan-based *Seventh Fleet*), the United States maintained in Japan twelve large bases, 136 other facilities, and 46,000 military personnel. Half of them were in the air force



28 | NOTES TO PAGES 193-202

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, May 23, 1966, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Trust Territories, box 55, Johnson Library.

53. Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 472; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, undated, Fall 1967, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 251, Johnson library.

54. McNamara memorandum for the President, Aug. 30, 1967, Confidential File, CO 141, C 51-3, box 10, Johnson Library; Rostow to Johnson, Sept. 12, 1967, box 76, President's Appointment File, *ibid.*

55. Memorandum for the Record of NSC Meeting on Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Western Pacific Islands, Aug. 31, 1967, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, box 2, Johnson Library; Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, Memorandum for the President, "Talking Points for Use with Japanese Officials," Aug. 31, 1967, Confidential File, CO 140, CO 141 Japan, box 10, *ibid.*; Rush to Johnson, "United States-Japan Cabinet-level Talks," Sept. 4, 1967, *ibid.*; Joint State/Treasury/Defense Memorandum, "U.S. Financial and Military Expenditures Relationships with Japan," Aug. 22, 1967, NLF 93-140, *ibid.*

56. "Statement by Secretary Fowler for Meeting with Minister Mizuta," Sept. 14, 1967, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 252, Johnson Library; Rush to Johnson, Nov. 10, 1967, *ibid.*, box 253, "Talking Points for Sato Visit," no date, *ibid.*; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 476.

57. For a discussion of Japanese and American positions on Okinawa and related issues, see Rostow to Johnson, "Okinawa," Aug. 22, 1967, Confidential File, CO 140, NLF 93-140, Johnson Library.

58. Memorandum, 1967, Johnson Library.

Mandatory Review Case #NLF 92-154 Johnson Library

59. Sato file, Japan-Sato Visit Briefing Book, 11/67, National Security File, Country file, Japan, box 253, Johnson Library; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 482.

60. Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 486-88.

61. Chenevert, Cooper to Averell Harriman, May 2, 1968, box 251, Johnson Library; Harriman to Chenevert, May 2, 1968, *ibid.*

62. Rostow to Johnson, "Okinawa," Aug. 22, 1967, Confidential File, CO 140, NLF 93-140, Johnson Library; Rostow to Rusk, "Okinawa," May 2, 1968, *ibid.*; David Osborn, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to Department of State, N.Y.C., May 7, 1968, *ibid.*; David Osborn, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to Department of State, N.Y.C., May 10, 1968, *ibid.*, box 251; for evidence that the president read the June 3 telegram, see Memorandum for Mr. Rostow by Rusk and Johnson, June 3, 1968, *ibid.*, box 252.

63. Ibid.

64. Memorandum of conversation, Rusk and U.S. Ambassador to Japan, June 6, 1968, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 253, Johnson Library.

65. Rostow memorandum for the President, June 12, 1968, National Security File, Country file, Japan, box 252, Johnson Library; memorandum for Rostow, "Amb. Johnson's Call on the President," June 14, 1968, *ibid.*

66. Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 514-17.

#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER 12

1. Aspir Shambhu, Jan. 22, 1971.  
2. *Time*, May 13, 1971. Connally quoted in Haldeman-Daugherty papers, White House Special Files, Nixon Project Haldeman notes. This valuable collection consists of the written conversations with Nixon and of talks between the president after his return from his "diary," which he dictated at night; Nixon's boast about "stickin' it in" Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1994), 140.